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The health care industry and the nation's hospitals are in the throes of revolution-
ary change. The shift to managed care resulted in fundamental changes in the de-
livery of care and the structure of health care, For the past ten years, hospitals
have actively been merging and creating large-scale integrated delivery systems.
Employers, eager to expand market share and reduce costs, are engaged in radical
reorganization of the hospital and the structure of work from which no group is
immune. Physicians, nurses, technicians, and housekeepers are all affected by
these changes. Hospitals are reducing their personnel, shifting work outside the
hospital, and reclassifying work. Employees and their unions are responding to
these changes at the bargaining table, and the State House, and are actively build-
ing coalitions to advocate for quality patient care and for employment standards to
secure their jobs.
A leading, nationally recognized public hospital, announces its intention to merge with a
private teaching hospital. For the next two years there is a major public debate over the
merits of the merger, its impact on the health care delivery system, and the effect on the
more than four thousand workers at the institutions.
Hundreds of hospital workers and community residents pack a community auditorium.
Weeks before, hospital trustees announced their intention to sell the hospital. Everyone is
anxious. They are there to hear representatives of several major health care corporations
discuss the advantages of affiliation with a specific network. Two of the contenders are for-
profit national hospital corporations and the third is a major area network of hospitals.
Several dozen laundry and housekeeping workers gather in a conference room in a midsize
central Massachusetts hospital. A human resources staff person nervously awaits the ar-
rival of a hospital vice president. Within minutes, they hear about the contracting out of
thirty-two jobs. Each of the affected workers has a minimum of seven years of service in
what for many of them is the most secure job they have ever held. Hospital administrators
tell them that they will be allowed to reapply for their jobs but that the new contractor will
set different wages and benefits.
Enid Eckstein, former staff director, Service Employees International Union 285, who was
instrumental in the formation of the Boston Medical Center, is a member of the AFL-CIO
Mobilization Department.
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A major for-profit hospital corporation announces its intention to purchase a medium-size
suburban hospital. The corporation, with a controversial record of providing free care,
seeks to gain a market foothold in the state. The company announces that it will spend $3
billion to create a network in the state. The company makes many promises to the commu-
nity.
A hospital lays off forty full-time nurses. On the same day the administration posts sixty
part-time nursing positions, explaining to its nurses that the hospital needs "flexibility to
manage."
Such scenes are taking place across the country. Hospitals are closing, merging, or
selling out to for-profit corporations. Smaller community hospitals either close or
become part of larger health care networks. Major free-standing hospitals seek part-
ners and merge. Major for-profit chains increase their control over the health care mar-
ket. The merger and acquisition frenzy that shaped industry in the 1980s has come full
force to health care in the 1990s. Health care procedures, once delivered within the
confines of hospitals is increasingly being delivered outside the confines of the hospital.
How the industry is changing, how work is being transformed, and how both workers
and unions are responding to this rapid transformation is the subject of this article. The
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 285 represents thousands of hospital
workers who are confronted with these changes. Every day health care workers struggle
and respond to the transformation of the industry. At the same time they maintain the hard-
fought gains won through unionization.
The Roots of Change: Why?
The radical changes in health care are part of an ongoing transformation whose roots are in
the 1960s. President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society expanded health care to the
nation's poor and elderly with the introduction of Medicare coverage for the elderly and
Medicaid coverage for the poor. By making Medicare available to the large segments of the
population that had been denied care and by offering to reimburse doctors and hospitals
for all their costs, including capital expansion, the federal government encouraged unprec-
edented growth in the number of hospitals and delivery of health care regardless of cost.
The lack of a national health care plan encouraged each hospital to spend large sums of
money on duplication of costly equipment. By the early 1970s, health care costs skyrock-
eted. National spending rose from 38 percent to 43 percent of all health care. 1
The government, alarmed by its high medical bills, made reining in health care costs
a top national priority. Beginning in 1983, the Medicare reimbursement system
switched to a fixed price per disease diagnosis, designated as diagnostic related groups
(DRGs) covering 468 specific diseases. Each hospital was given 468 categories into
which all patients must fit. Each DRG had a preset price tag so that the hospital knew
how much it would be reimbursed for each patient. In the past, hospitals billed Medi-
care for all patient-related costs, including depreciation, interest costs, and profits, after
the facts. Under the old system, a hospital could bill Medicare for any procedure and
allocate costs as long as they were directly or indirectly related to the provision of care.
In contrast, under the DRG system, each hospital is paid a fixed price per patient ac-
cording to the patient's diagnosis, regardless of actual cost. Under the old system, it was
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difficult for hospitals to realize a profit on Medicare. The new prospective payment
system provided hospital administrators with an incentive to reduce hospital costs.
Since they knew the reimbursement rate up front, smart administrators could make a
profit if they could cuts costs. DRGs provided an incentive to reduce hospital stays,
discharge patients early, dump less desirable patients with multiple problems, and re-
duce the number of procedures offered to patients. Government policy shifted emphasis
from expanding care and capacity to controlling costs.
Administrators used the new system to wage war on workers and existing standards.
By reducing the number of patient days, hospitals began to reduce the workforce.
Within a few years the number of full-time-equivalent hospital workers dropped by
145,000 from the 3.2 million of 1983, according to American Hospital Association
statistics.
2 The new system managed to slow the rise in hospital costs, and admission
rates dropped. While the cost-reduction drive was successful, the new cost cutting was a
major boon for hospitals, which continued to expand services and invest in new con-
struction. Nineteen eighty-four was a record year for hospital profits.
Other Pressures to Reduce Costs
At the same time, the private sector sought to reduce its escalating health care bills.
Employers endeavored to reduce costs by attacking employee health care plans, build-
ing in controls by requiring preadmission testing and second opinions. Many employees
moved away from traditional indemnity, fee-for-service, plans because they became too
expensive. Many employers introduced a health maintenance organization as an option.
Workers accustomed to unlimited choices suddenly found their health care determined
and limited by costs. Employers often passed on increased costs in the form of higher
employee co-pays. Many important union contract battles were fought over unionized
workers being forced into co-payment for health insurance or to move from an indem-
nity plan to an HMO. As costs increased, employee take-home pay was reduced.
A Move to Managed Care
The drive to cut costs escalated with the rise of health maintenance organizations and
others pledged to "manage" care. In a 1988 survey, 71 percent of insured Americans
were in traditional fee-for-service plans and 29 percent in managed care. Seven years
later those numbers were reversed: at the end of 1995, 30 percent of covered Americans
were in fee-for-service plans and 70 percent in some form of managed care. Also by the
end of 1995, more than 56 million Americans were enrolled in some form of health
maintenance organization. An additional 70 million were in more traditional insurance
plans with some features designed to manage care.
The term "managed care" refers to a wide range of organizational and payment
changes that are intended to eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate care and reduce
costs. Most such plans call for the formal enrollment of patients in a managed care
organization. Managed care payment arrangements also vary widely, ranging from fully
capitated — full risk — plans to fee-for-service — primary care case management—
plans. In a fully capitated plan, the HMO receives a set fee, usually monthly, for each
enrollee regardless of the type or amount of services an individual may need or use.
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Shifting Power from Provider to Payer
The move to managed care represented a radical power shift in the health care payment
structure. The traditional fee-for-service system placed power squarely in the hands of
the health care providers. Physicians and hospitals could make money by providing as
many services as possible by increasing the fees for them and keeping labor costs down.
Hospitals expanded and dominated the market. Under a managed care system, power
shifts from the providers to payers, employers or purchasing groups, because they nego-
tiate a flat "per head" fee for all services provided to each person covered. Under this
system, the best way for hospitals to make money is to minimize, not maximize, ser-
vices and to cut costs wherever possible. The result is a new cutthroat competition
based on lowering costs.
To survive financially under a payer-controlled system, hospitals have a hard time
remaining independent entities for they must reduce costs and guarantee their share of
the market. By networking with other hospitals, they have the potential to reduce un-
necessary duplication of services, penetrate new geographic markets, and maintain their
market share. Under an increasingly capitated system, physicians and hospitals make
money by maximizing their patient base and providing as little service as possible to
these patients at the lowest possible cost. Combined with pressure from investors to
maintain high profit margins, the move to capitation has led to a new wave of corporate
mergers and cost-cutting measures.
Hospitals maximize profits by reducing hospital stays and shifting work to other
settings where overhead is lower. The incentive is to deliver care at the lowest rung of
the delivery system. If it can be provided in an outpatient setting, insurance reimburses
only at that rate. If a patient can be discharged and treated at home, insurance reim-
burses only at that rate. Hospital utilization rates are declining nationwide. In 1990 the
average length of stay was 6.7 days per admission and in 1996 that figure was 5.6 days.
Just ten years earlier it was seven days. A good case in point is the number of days a
mother is hospitalized for the birth of a child. Twenty-five years ago a woman remained
in a hospital for four days for a normal delivery. By the early 1990s, two days was com-
mon. In many hospitals it is now twenty-four hours after the birth of the child. In some
cases discharge is eight hours after delivery.
As the length of hospital stays decreases and the number of beds declines, work is
being shifted out of the hospital. As patients are discharged earlier they are increasingly
sent home, where they require follow-up or outpatient care. Surgery, which several
years ago required a two-night stay, is increasingly performed on an outpatient basis.
This is reflected by the drastic rise in hospital outpatient visits from 80 million in 1990
to 128 million in 1995.
Hospitals are merging at an unprecedented rate and forming integrated delivery sys-
tems in which hospitals, doctors, community health centers, outpatient surgical centers,
home care agencies, and other health providers form one giant entity. The hospitals
claim that by joining with others they are seeking greater economies of scale and better
access to capital to finance other ventures. In the last three years there have been more
than one hundred mergers nationally. At the end of this consolidation phase, most major
urban centers will have no more than two or three major systems in place.
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The Failure of National Health Care Reform
The American public has long been demanding an overhaul of the nation's health care
system. Its costs have been rising faster than anything else, accounting for 1 3 percent of
the gross national product. During the 1992 presidential election, everyone talked about
reforming the nation's health care delivery system. President Clinton, whose campaign
platform promised major change in it was overrun by powerful industry lobby groups.
Health care reform was "dead on arrival" when it finally made its way to Congress.
Absence of a federal policy has created a vacuum that has been filled by managed care
companies, insurance companies, and state legislatures eager to reduce their own health
care costs. Dr. Samuel Thier, chief executive officer of Partners HealthCare System,
commented that "the system is not driven by any commitment to broadening access to
care. There is little incentive for managed care companies to serve the uninsured." 3
Individual states, in the absence of national policy, have taken matters into their own
hands. Numerous states, including Massachusetts, adopted their own approach to mar-
ket reform. In 1991, the commonwealth deregulated much of the health care environ-
ment. The state encouraged selective contracting, which gave even more power to
HMOs and insurance companies. Such contracting enables payers to negotiate dis-
counted rates from providers in return for an expected volume of patient visits. Under
this policy, a particular HMO could contract all its maternity coverage to one or two
selected hospitals in a geographic area All its patients would deliver their babies only
at those hospitals. As a result, HMOs could determine which hospitals would survive
and which would languish. The increased power of HMOs was evidenced by the ongo-
ing struggle between New England Medical Center Hospital and Harvard Pilgrim when
the HMO threatened to squeeze NEMCH by refusing to pay for its patients to be treated
there.
At the same time, state government has encouraged hospital closings as the main
hospital cost-containment strategy. Hospital closings disproportionately hurt urban poor
communities. National evidence shows that urban hospital closings are likeliest in poor
communities where unmet health needs are already greatest. Massachusetts has seen
hospitals closed in Fitchburg, Worcester, Dorchester, and Lynn.
Pressure on Public Hospitals.
The changing market structure disproportionately squeezes public hospitals which, with
public health care systems, provide an important safety net for millions of uninsured
and underinsured patients. At a typical hospital, more than half the inpatient days are
covered by Medicare while only 10 percent are covered by Medicaid. Most of the re-
mainder are covered by private insurance. At a typical urban public hospital, 45 percent
of patients are on Medicaid, and 20 percent pay for themselves. Self-pay includes those
with no insurance, which makes it unlikely that the hospital will collect the money. This
pattern is even more pronounced for outpatient visits to public hospitals, where 37 per-
cent of visits are self-pay and 32 percent are reimbursed by Medicaid. 4 As a result, costs
for treating these patients are either uncompensated or undercompensated so that public
hospitals and clinics have had to rely on a variety of means to cover them. These in-
clude cost shifting to insured patients and subsidies from federal, state, and local gov-
ernment bodies.
79
New England Journal of Public Policy
Across the nation, local governments are under pressure to trim local budgets. Many
local politicians believe that their governments should get out of the health care busi-
ness. Local advocates for divestment are often joined by administrators who feel that
public hospitals are hindered by restrictive laws that regulate their activities and restrict
their ability to compete. In a further turn of the screw, government cost cutters are re-
ducing payments to teaching institutions for the inner-city poor. Last year the Univer-
sity of California at Irvine lost 65 percent of its subsidies although its patients did not
disappear. The hospital, giving up, began to negotiate with a for-profit chain to lease the
hospital. In the last few years many local governments privatized their hospitals, cut
services, or contracted out the management to a private corporation. Others are still in
the process of exploring alternative options. Over the past five years virtually every
Massachusetts public hospital has closed, transformed its governance structure, or been
privatized. Among those affected are the following:
Hunt Hospital (Danvers): Closed
Bridgewater State Hospital: Privatized
Springfield Municipal Hospital: Sold
Worcester County Hospital: Sold
Boston City Hospital: Merged with Boston University Hospital; privatized
University of Massachusetts Medical Center (Worcester): Merged with Worcester
Memorial; privatized
Hale Hospital (Haverhill): Engaged in ongoing discussions about its future
While the bottom line for individual communities may improve with divestment, the
outlook for community-based health care is unclear.
Managed Care Comes to Medicaid
A major pressure on public hospitals is the shift of Medicaid to managed care. From
1981 to 1993 the number of public hospitals declined by more than 25 percent. "The
mood of the country right now is that nobody wants to increase taxes," reports Ms.
Burch of the Public Hospital Association. "There is a strong sentiment business does
things better than government does and that spills over to people's attitudes toward
public hospitals. I think people are questioning how much we need public hospitals."4
The federal government has turned over Medicaid regulation to the states, many of
which have instituted some form of managed care to administer their plan. This ap-
proach uses networks of selected providers and institutions to provide care. Private
hospitals seeking to increase their patient base are eager to recruit the managed care
Medicaid population. As a result, public hospitals often have a hard time maintaining
their traditional historic patient base. Many are incapable of competing because their
facilities are less attractive and their costs higher than those of private hospitals for a
variety of reasons. When New York instituted a state program with state incentives,
300,000 Medicaid recipients joined Medicaid managed care programs. Only 8 percent
joined the public health care system. Private hospitals where beds remain empty are
recruiting Medicaid patients they turned away just a few years ago, forcing the public
hospitals to compete with them for patients who have been their traditional base.
Across the country, local governments are working hard to dump their public hospi-
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tals, seeking either to sell them off or to privatize them. These moves raise considerable
serious concern over the ability to take care of the nation's uninsured poor. The Califor-
nia experience is instructive; hospitals subject to intense price competition and great
fiscal pressure from Medicare and Medicaid reduced their uncompensated care load
compared with hospitals facing less competitive pressure, according to a study of pri-
vate hospitals. 5
Merger Mania
Hospitals faced with excess capacity, losses from public programs, and managed care
seek to maintain their financial stability. One strategy they have pursued is collabora-
tion through mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures. Merger and acquisition activity
totaled $20 billion in 1994. In the first five months of 1995, U.S. health care mergers
worth $13 billion had been announced in health services alone, compared with the $7
billion spent in the same 1994 period. Countrywide there have been more than one
hundred hospital mergers to date. In Massachusetts the race to merge has been under
way for a number of years. Its official kickoff date was 1993, when the Brigham and
Women's Hospital and the Massachusetts General Hospital announced their merger and
intention to form Partners HealthCare System. Three and a half years later its network
includes 16,000 employees and 754 primary care doctors in eleven hospitals throughout
Massachusetts and others on the drawing board. Since then numerous other hospitals
have formed partnerships and their own networks for survival. Those institutions which
did not rush to the altar are finding it difficult to survive as free-standing entities. Virtu-
ally every Massachusetts hospital has entertained and engaged suitors, as witness the
following listing, which outlines some of the major market realignments of the past few
years. Unnamed hospitals may be part of smaller regional systems or, like Quincy Hos-
pital, may be independent. However, because these mergers occur so frequently, this















Massachusetts Eye and Ear
Anna Jacques
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New England Medical Center
Newport Hospital
The Growth of For-profit Medicine
The 1990s saw the expansion of for-profit health care systems. Companies like Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, OrNda, Tenet, Quorum, and others began to dominate
the scene. In the last three years, with Columbia/HCA leading a revival, more than one
hundred community hospitals have been taken over by the profit-making industry. This
wave of conversions has become the biggest transfer of charitable assets in history,
nearly $9 billion in all.6 In the late 1980s and the 1990s, Columbia/HCA began to build
its empire, which has grown to more than 344 hospitals that treat more than 125,000
people a day.7 Columbia earned $1.5 billion on sales of $19.9 billion in 1996. 8
Columbia, with 285,000 workers and 1996 revenues of $230 billion, the world's
largest health care corporation, 9 has come under intense government scrutiny for alleged
Medicare fraud. In March 1997, the government raided its El Paso office, and in early
July, FBI and other federal agents served thirty-five search warrants in seven states,
launching a major investigation of potential Medicare overtoiling and fraud. In one case
Columbia is charged with overtoiling $1.77 million. 10 In another investigation, officials
are determining whether a maze of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries acquired by Co-
lumbia were used by some of its hospitals to obtain unwarranted federal reimbursement
deceitfully.
11 Richard Scott, the chief operating officer, resigned as a result of the probe.
Columbia and other companies began to buy up hospitals throughout the South and
Southwest in the late 1980s and 1990s. As the competition to survive grew more in-
tense, companies with deep pockets quickly moved in. Communities with struggling
hospitals became easy targets for purchase or takeover by entities like Columbia. A
community that had received no tax contributions from the local nonprofit hospital was
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often convinced to sell its institution or enter into a joint venture with Columbia. In turn
it would receive local taxes and Columbia would establish a foundation to respond to
community needs. For each of these communities the result was far from that. Within a
few years of Columbia's conquest, the hospitals often reported a decrease in care of the
indigent.
For-profit health care burst on the Massachusetts scene in 1995. Columbia an-
nounced its intention to purchase MetroWest, the former Leonard Morse Hospital, and
Framingham Union Hospital. Despite organized opposition of the academic medical
community and the public, several large public community hearings, and legislative
hearings, the deal went through. In signing the document to purchase MetroWest, Co-
lumbia announced its intention to spend $3.5 billion in Massachusetts for "network
acquisition." Responding to the MetroWest takeover, Rhode Island activists and legisla-
tors have won a ban on any further incursions of profit-making hospitals in their state.
Current antitrust law has proved ineffective and incapable of reigning in the power of
these giants. It is impossible for a small community or public hospital to compete in
this market. For many hospitals the fundamental question is not whether to join a net-
work but which network can survive.
Concern over the increase of for-profit health care stems from general concern about
care delivery. When a company like Columbia diverts funds and overbills, the quality of
care is apt to be affected. When the corporation announced the sale of its home care
business, SEIU responded by releasing "Acute Need," a report revealing how bare-bones
staffing at Columbia's largest hospital, Sunrise in Las Vegas, contributed to its inability
to feed stroke patients on time; to IV dressings remaining unchanged for a week or more;
to errors in delivery of IV medications and fluids increasing the risk of complications and
infections; to inability to follow doctors' orders; to some patients not being bathed for
three days running. 12
Workers and Unions Respond to the Changing World
One doesn't need a crystal ball to see that shorter hospital stays, mergers, and closings
have major impacts on health care workers. Those who once thought the system was
stable and their jobs secure are learning about insecurity firsthand. Health care workers
in every sector— hospitals, HMOs, nursing homes, and home health care — are on the
front lines of an industry in change. Top-level management discuss plans and potential
deals behind closed doors. Rumors fly through workplaces. Employees often learn of
pending changes through the media.
Hospitals are cutting costs by reducing the number of full-time-equivalent positions.
Layoffs are the most common form of cost cutting, but hospitals employ a number of
other strategies.
• Reducing the number of health care jobs;
• Converting permanent full-time positions to part-time and contingent
positions;
• Transferring services from inside the hospital environment to less costly
community-based settings;
• Restructuring work performance and job design;
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• Changing hospital governance;
• Attacking working conditions and standards;
• Challenging the union's existence.
In many areas of the country there is little union organization among health care
workers. In those areas where they represent hospital workers, unions have been in the
forefront of responding to these changes and to overall industry restructuring. Without a
union, employees are left with little protection. As in any situation of monumental
change within an industry, there are varying approaches unions and their members can
employ in their fight to retain jobs. Union strategies can best be categorized in the fol-
lowing areas:
• Defensive fights over job retention;
• Fights over access to care and quality care;
• Control over skills and maintenance of skill levels;
• Maintenance and expansion of the union's market share and its ability
to control standards within the health care environment.
Hospitals Take the Offensive
There was always an implicit social contract for hospital workers. Although a hospital job
never paid a great deal, it was fairly secure. Employees worked hard and were rewarded
with a paycheck, decent benefits, and a clear sense of protection. Hospitals, unlike
manufacturing facilities, were not going to move overseas. Health care employees,
watching other workers being laid off, believed that their jobs were safe.
Cost Cutting
With the arrival of the 1990s, the very fabric of this agreement was ripped apart. Hospi-
tal work was no longer secure! As hospitals seek to slash costs, their first target is labor.
As the number of beds is reduced, patient stays are shorter, and more care is delivered
outside their walls, hospitals require less staff. If patients are discharged from hospitals
two days earlier than ten years previously, there are six fewer meals to prepare per pa-
tient, fewer rooms to clean, fewer tests to administer, and less laundry to process, there
is less need for nurses, dietary workers, technicians, housekeepers, and people provid-
ing specialized and support systems.
Hospital jobs used to dominate the industry. In 1970, two-thirds of all health care
workers were employed by hospitals. Today that population has dropped to 50 percent.
The growth of hospital employment will slow in the next ten years, and hospitals' share
of all health care jobs will be closer to 40 percent of the workforce. By the year 2000,
experts predict, hospitals will cut 80,000 additional beds and reduce the number of
inpatient staff.
Limited surveys and data demonstrate that staffs are being downsized. A 1994 survey
of 1,143 hospitals and 41 health care systems conducted by Deloitte and Touche showed
that 58 percent of hospitals had cut their line workers and 49 percent anticipated doing
so over the next five years. The most basic form of health care force reduction is the
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traditional layoff. Yet many other forms of job attrition are not reflected in these figures.
Many hospitals contract out existing services like food supply, cafeteria, laundry, house-
keeping, and clerical work to private profit-making corporations because administrators
believe that contractors can provide them at a lower cost than their current rate. A con-
tractor may offer jobs to the displaced workers, but at a radically reduced rate with few
benefits. In recent years contracting out, which was once restricted to food service,
laundry, and dietary departments, has escalated and is found at every level of hospital
services. Laboratory services, direct patient care, billing, and secretarial tasks can all be
contracted out. Although contractors can often offer them lower costs, hospitals can
encounter problems with staff turnover and the quality of work provided. Some admin-
istrations have reinstated previously contracted-out services in their hospitals.
Another major change involves employers that eliminate a set number of full-time
jobs, then simply reconfigure them as part-time arrangements that usually do not pay
employee benefits. It is estimated that more than 40 percent of health care jobs are now
filled by contingent workers, 10 percent contract and 29 percent part time. 13 While the
increased use of contingent workers may be cost-effective by hospital standards, it can
have an adverse impact on continuity of patient care.
Restructuring Jobs
Today a major focus is on reinventing or redesigning hospitals. Reengineering, which
regards health care as a series of integrated processes that can be made more efficient,
had formerly been limited to manufacturing but began to find its way into the hospital
in the late 1980s. Health care analysts and consultants who have studied the provision
of health care describe the field as a landscape of inefficiency, waste, and poor services.
Chip Caldwell, CEO of West Paces Ferry Hospital in Florida, maintains that "health
care, like the manufacture of cars, can be viewed as a complex production system.
Transporting medical records or referring patients to specialists are all processes that
can be broken down." 14 Delivery of care, the experts point out, is broken into too many
fragmented tasks — housekeeping, food service, admitting, nursing, and so on. Some
studies indicate that one patient admitted to a hospital is seen by more than fifty-five
employees.
Over the years management experts have tried many approaches to redesigning the
hospital, the most popular being patient-focused care, which involves a fundamental
restructuring of work. Resources, processes, and staff are organized around patient
bedside care units rather than centralized functional departments or units. The plan is
based on work design and creates caregiver teams, cross-trains staff and reduces the
number of classifications, makes greater use of clinical protocols to standardize care,
and decentralizes most services. A 1992 survey of 311 hospitals shows that 31 percent
had implemented a patient-focused care program and another 16 percent planned to do
so over the following year. 15 A few basic concepts are at the core of patient-focused
care.
• Caregivers are cross-trained to provide 80 to 90 percent of services
patients need, including traditional bedside nursing, X-ray films, and
lab work. Appropriate X-ray and lab equipment is deployed to the unit
so that patients rarely leave the unit and almost never require schedul-
ing or transportation.
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• Caregivers admit their own patients and, in addition to taking charge of
medical coding and billing, change linen, pass trays, and perform simi-
lar tasks.
• A protocol-driven, predefined total care plan acts as the program for the
team. Nurses chart or document only unexpected or unusual changes
rather than the totality of a case. Documentation time is radically re-
duced and medical records are totally computerized. Protocols can't
rack such information as length of stay and average costs. Some phy-
sicians object because they believe that this type of structure limits
their authority.
• Long-term sustainable reductions in personnel are possible.
At the heart of this effort is a program to cut labor costs, streamline care, and in-
crease competitiveness. As one expert, Philip Lathrop, a vice president at Booz Allen, a
major reengineering firm, describes it, "The huge savings enabled by the patient-fo-
cused hospital will require us to redeploy and downsize many centralized functions
such as housekeeping, medical records, and routine areas of lab and radiology." 16 To do
this effectively, management must combine many tasks into a few, utilizing several
basic forms.
Restructured Teams
This entails using multiskilled teams to perform ancillary tasks by combining skills and
tasks previously performed by a number of licensed certified and unlicensed uncertified
occupations into one generic job title. Specific tasks and composition of these teams
vary according to the requirements of a specific hospital, patient population, and work-
site design. Kaiser Bellflower (California) Hospital restructured its staff through forma-
tion of the following teams:
Service partners. A cross-trained position that combines housekeeping, dietary, sup-
ply, transport, and nursing assistance duties. Their primary responsibility is housekeep-
ing, but they are trained in transport, dietary fundamentals, and other comfort care skills
that will enable them to assist the bedside team.
Technical partners. Cross-trained technical partners incorporate nursing assistant and
lab and EKG technician duties. In addition to their duties as a traditional nurse's aide,
technical partners draw blood and administer electrocardiograms.
Processing partners. These people perform unit clerk duties but are also cross-
trained in nursing assistance skills to lend helping hands to the bedside team.
Licensed practical nurses. Unlike some patient-focused models, this plan retains
LPNs.
Registered nurses. These nurses, who perform traditional R.N. tasks, are also cross-
trained in respiratory therapy, drawing blood, and taking EKGs, all tasks accomplished
at the bedside. 17
While the extent of the move to patient-focused care is unknown, many hospitals are
availing themselves of job redesign to cut labor costs and replace highly trained profes-
sionals with less skilled employees. A number of others have tried to pare costs by re-
ducing the number of registered nurses and replacing them with less capable personnel,
an approach known as de-skilling.
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De-skilling
De-skilling can be defined as the process by which a job is analyzed and quantified.
Those tasks which can be reassigned to a less skilled employee are so designated. De-
skilling has received most attention in connection with registered nurses. Hospitals
concerned with reducing R.N. costs have restructured their staffing mix and created
whole new sets of job classifications with titles like patient care technicians (PCTs),
nursing technicians, nursing extenders, and so forth. These jobs incorporate many tasks
that were previously performed by registered nurses. Feeding, changing, dressing, and
bathing patients, taking vital signs, and other bedside tasks are routinely performed by
PCTs. Only a few years ago, many hospitals staffed units with 90 percent registered
nurses and only 10 percent ancillary personnel. In 1995, the American Hospital Asso-
ciation reports, 97 percent of hospitals were using some form of nurse extender.
This is a radical shift for nurses whose labor was much in demand in the 1 980s.
Hospitals established staffing patterns that relied heavily on registered nurses and lim-
ited the role of licensed practical nurses. LPNs, who had previously been allowed to
perform many tasks, found themselves excluded from many parts of the hospital with
limits placed on what they could do. Many hospitals laid off LPNs and replaced them
with R.N.'s. By the late 1980s a serious nursing shortage had been created. Manage-
ment responded by radically increasing the rate of pay, benefits, and status of R.N.'s. In
a large number of cities, R.N. salaries increased by 20 percent and nursing schools were
suddenly flooded with applications. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a huge increase
of students in nursing programs, which shortly thereafter led to a major glut of regis-
tered nurses. Administrators of hospitals, faced with mounting costs, and especially
desirous of curtailing nursing costs, examined their staffing mix and the specific tasks
performed by R.N.'s.
In 1995 the Institute for Medicine issued a study stating that the "R.N. skill mix
appears to be dropping in many settings from a range of 76-100 percent to a range of
52-79 percent." 18 Many workers who deliver patient care at the bedside have been
cross-trained to perform these tasks, for they may previously have been housekeepers or
transport workers. There is no set state requirement for certification of patient care
technicians. Training and preceptor programs vary from institution to institution: one
hospital may provide eighty hours of training and others several months.
Unions representing R.N.'s have been in the forefront of the fight against de-skilling.
Legislation has been enacted in some states to limit the role of the PCTs, which has a
major impact on the delivery of quality care. An R.N. is trained to recognize subtle
differences in a patient's condition that can be important to an eventual outcome. Pa-
tient care technicians operate under the supervision of a registered nurse who may not
have sufficient time or staff to monitor a PCT's work or a patient's condition. PCTs,
who are not supposed to work on their own, are expected to report changes in a
patient's condition. But proper assessment of change is often a matter of clinical judg-
ment gained through education and training, not something that can be learned in a six-
week training class. Nurses' unions and associations have sought to define and limit the
role of PCTs through collective bargaining, state licensing boards, and state legislatures.
The ever increasing use of patient care technicians and decreasing reliance on registered
nurses is of great concern to the nursing profession.
The other considerable aspect of job restructuring is the multitasking approach in
which several jobs are made into one by combining the duties of multiple departments
under one title. As medical technology and expertise expanded during the past twenty
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issues. Bargaining in the 1980s concentrated on improving wages and status for health
care employees, especially nurses. The other critical thrust, a fight over staffing and
quality of care, enabled local unions to make individual breakthroughs in staffing
language.
As the newly created climate began to emerge, the accepted bargaining approach
was limited. Administrators, as always, resisted attempts to bargain over quality of
care and staffing. Hospital management tried to subvert existing union structures
through the introduction of numerous total quality management (TQM) programs.
Those in charge tried to convince union members that they could solve many of their
concerns through TQM problem solving rather than established union procedures.
Union members often problem-solved themselves out of a job. While workers may
have been wooed into cooperating with management to solve hospitalwide difficulties,
it soon became clear that those in power had only one goal in mind: cutting costs,
especially labor costs.
Existing contract language and labor law could not anticipate managed care, hospi-
tal mergers, and for-profit conversions. Local unions recognized that the fight would
take place on many fronts. They quickly developed new strategies to deal with
multilocations, successor employers, multiemployers, mergers, privatization, and
accretion of nonunion areas. Local union representatives, realizing that they had to
become experts on mergers if they were to survive, versed themselves in all aspects of
merger law and forms of governance and financing. Unions began to put forward lan-
guage that would protect members.
Changes in governance put unions into the political and legislative arenas.
Whether it was the Boston City Hospital/Boston University Medical Center Hospi-
tal merger, which required both City Council and state legislative approval, or the
sale of MetroWest, which required the approval of the state attorney general's
office, unions have had to mount a large-scale political campaign. Local unions
fought to make survival or successorship of the union and its contract a term and
condition of sale. Union members began to understand that meaningful job protec-
tions and security clauses were harder to win than wage increases.
The Fight for Job Security
Unions are in the forefront of the fight for job security. They seek to develop contract
provisions that will minimize job loss, ensure members' future job security by giving
them access to new jobs created by the employer and redesigned jobs, and protect
laid-off members, which can take several forms.
• No-layoff clauses. Some hospital employers and unions have agreed
that there will be no layoffs for current employees under the terms of
the agreement. In some cases unions have won this protection as a
trade-off for no wage increase or a willingness to participate in job
redesign.
• Severance pay. Some unions have negotiated quite generous severance
packages for members as a disincentive to layoff.
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• Transfer rights to other network institutions. In the event of a
merger, employees would have the right to transfer to other
institutions within a network whether or not they were union
ized. This could cover all facilities within a network, including
extended-care facilities and home care programs.
• Job security provisions. 1 199 New York and the League of
Voluntary Hospitals in New York negotiated a model program.
In the event layoffs are unavoidable, employees receive assis
tance by means of training programs to learn new skills, supple
mental unemployment insurance benefits, and ability to
transfer to other hospitals, for example.
Bargaining over job redesign. The best approach to protecting members'
jobs is to ensure that they can fill the new jobs that are being created in the
hospital environment. In some cases management presents the union with newly
created jobs and the union bargains about it. In other cases management and the
union establish ground rules that govern negotiations over work restructuring.
The Service Employees International and other unions have established general
principles that include the following.
1. The union must have full participation and an equal role in the
work reorganization and job design process
2. The process should be consistent with the collective bargaining
agreement and should be bargained, not imposed.
3. Job security guarantees must ensure that work reorganization
and job redesign do not lead to layoffs.
4. Redesign should include a commitment to training workers for
the new jobs.
5. A placement process for workers who are unable to qualify for
new jobs.
6. Seniority rights must be protected.
7. Members should maintain the same or greater rate of pay if
moved to a restructured job.
8. Cost savings or other benefits derived from the process must be
shared equitably by all participants.
9. Staffing commensurate with quality patient care must be main-
tained in restructuring of the workplace and jobs.
10. No contracting out or part-time jobs as a result of restructuring.
11. Protection of the unions' bargaining unit. 19
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Bargaining for Quality Care
Health care workers know firsthand that many of the changes created by managed care
have undermined both their ability to deliver good care and the quality of care. As
workers and consumers of health care, health care personnel are in a unique position to
speak out for quality care. Unions have long supported (1) an end to gag rules and (2)
patients' rights to full access to a health plan and doctors' rates. Local and international
unions have been in the forefront of the fight for access to affordable quality care.
Health care workers are also involved in the fight to ensure that the caregivers who
deliver the services can do so in a professional, dignified manner. Health care workers
bargain and fight to maintain a high-quality work environment despite all the affronts
on their ability to perpetuate one. This includes proper training and certification of
direct caregivers, proper staffing ratios, specific R.N. and LPN ratios to ancillary staff,
and limits on the use of per diem and contingent workers to ensure ongoing continuity
of care and proper health and safety protections for employees
Unions cannot win these changes by themselves. They have to join together to build
broad-based community organizations and coalitions to fight for a truly patient-driven,
not profit-driven, health care system. Some consumer and community coalitions have
been disconnected from the concerns of health care workers, at times playing off their
needs against community and consumer needs. Building coalitions that bridge commu-
nity, consumer, and worker concerns is a must to mount a movement to regain control of
the health care system.
Need for Policy
The lack of national policy has opened the door to corporations, for-profit med-icine,
and meganetworks of health care providers. A long-term solution that restructures Ameri-
can medicine under a single-payer plan would provide affordable health care to all and re-
move the profit motive. While that may be the long-term answer for what ails the health
care system, it is necessary to address a number of more immediate policy issues.
e Merger protections. Existing federal antitrust law has not had an impact
on health care mergers. Legislation must be adopted to meet the
following needs:
• Guarantees of affordable health care to a community;
• Full disclosure to the public of all terms and conditions of a
merger;
• Successorship protections to workers in union contracts;
• Consumer protections;
• Maintenance of services to the community;
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• Ban on for-profit medicine. For-profit hospitals and HMOs
are more concerned with profit making than with providing
quality care. The lack of a national plan has forced states to
take action into their own hands and several, like Rhode
Island, have sought to limit or ban for-profit companies.
• Quality of care protections. There is an abundance of horror stories
regarding one-day mastectomies and twenty-four-hour maternity stays.
The accidental chemotherapy drug overdose of a Boston Globe colum-
nist at Dana-Farber Cancer Institute points to the need for greater
control over quality. Various states have passed legislation requiring
minimum lengths of stay for maternity and mastectomy patients.
• Union protections. Health care workers are frequently the best advo-
cates for quality care in the managed care environment. They know
first-hand what is happening on a hospital floor. Doctors who have spo
ken out against substandard care have found themselves censured and
gagged by health maintenance organizations. Doctors, many of whom
cite managed care as the precipitating cause, have begun to organize in
several states. Unless workers are protected by a union they cannot
speak out against the abuses of managed care. Mergers and changing
hospital governance should not be a green light for the industry to go
after unions. As hospitals merge, larger bargaining units are created.
Existing labor law has proved inadequate to cope with the changing
industry. Legislation must be enacted to require the hospital industry to
pay its share of retraining for the health care workers of the future.
• Security funds. In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. auto industry faced
foreign competition, and hundreds of thousands of workers were laid
off for long periods. The federal government, after intense lobbying,
passed the Trade Readjustment Act, which provided supplemental
insurance benefits and generous retraining funds for displaced workers.
Similar legislation should be enacted to cover health care workers.
• The legal right to union representation should be extended to private-
sector interns and residents, who are currently denied such protection.
Existing labor law must reflect the changing environment.
Health care workers, who understand that managed care has brought many changes
to their industry, want to know that they will be protected deceitfully as the industry
continues to transform itself. They especially want to work in an environment that al-
lows them to deliver the best possible care to their patients. Unions will fight to ensure
these protections. d»
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